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be assumptions critically challenged in one or another attempt at solving the paradoxes, and the goal of attempts at solution may be precisely to show that the apparent semantic instability of such paradoxes is merely apparent-that despite appearances, for e'xample, the Liar does have some single and stable third truth-value. What we want to explore, however, are the apparent semantic patterns themselves, regardless of whether these are portrayed as merely apparent within one or another ,attempt at solution.
In what follows we offer some new ways of using computer graphics to analyze the apparent semantic behavior of a variety of paradoxes, both old and new.' When considered within the range of an infinite-valued logic and on the mathematical model of iterated functions studied in chaos theory,2 in particular, familiar paradoxes often show elegant, unexpected, and visually beautiful semantic patterns, and exhibit moreover a number of surprising structural relations.
In section I below we outline the parametric-operator development of infinite-valued logic, due to Nicholas Rescher, that we will be using throughout, and indicate by example some basic tools of graphic analysis.
Section II is an extended tour of some of the remarkable images generated under such graphic analysis by both familiar paradoxesincluding the Liar, the Heterological paradox, the Curry paradox, and Dualist forms of the Liar-and a range of new variations suggested by tools of the analysis itself. Here we introduce a sentence we call the Chaotic Liar which exhibits genuinely chaotic semantic behavior and proves to be of quite central importance. Our analysis of variations on the Dualist takes us into both strange attractors and fractals.
The graphic exhibition and analysis of this range of paradoxes is admittedly a main purpose of the present paper, and in this regard we must confess to a fascination with the beauty of the images themselves. In section III, however, we also offer a brief example of philosophical and metamathematical applications. Here we use a strengthening of the Chaotic Liar to illustrate an intriguing route into limitative results regarding chaos theory itself in the tradition of G6del (1931) One consideration is that of vague statements. Take for example:
(1) It is cold today .
Is (1) either absolutely true or absolutely false? Is (2) Alvin looks like Abraham Lincoln or (3) Oklahoma is a lovely state either absolutely true or absolutely false? In many cases, at least, the common unprompted and untutored response is that such examples are not simply true or false, but more or less true-that (3) is less true than (2), perhaps, itself less true than (1), which is fairly true. And this common response, at least for sentences such as these, may ultimately be the right one.5
It is also possible to view the values assigned to statements within an infinite-valued logic as something other than genuine truth-values. Even those most uncompromising in their bivalence with regard to truth and falsity, for example, are quite willing to admit that some propositions may be more or less accurate. On a second interpretation, then, the assignment of a value of .7 to a statement might be taken to indicate not a measure of partial truth but simply a measure of accuracy.
Our treatment throughout is perhaps more in accord with the first approach to infinite-valued logics: we will often speak as if sentences can genuinely take any of a continuum of semantic values between truth and falsity.6 Nonetheless we don't consider our task here to be one of arguing for infinite-valued logics in general, and we don't feel ourselves in any way committed philosophically to the ultimate rightness of infinitely many semantic values. Our approach is hypothetical: what does the semantic behavior of certain sentences look like if we do assume an infinite-valued logic?
Assuming a range of real values between 0 and 1, and representing the value of a sentence p as /p/, we will take the value of -p to be i-/p/. For sentences p and q with values /p/ and /q/, we take the value of (p & q) to be min{/p/,/q/} and the value of (p v q) to be max{/p/,/q/}.
All of this is a straightforward generalization from standard finitely many-valued logics. The value of (p q) we take to be max{1-/p/,/q/}.7
We will also use Nicholas Rescher's development of infinitevalued logics in terms of a parametrized propositional operator. Following Rescher, we take the value of a proposition Vvp asserting that a proposition p has value v to be given by: /Vvp/ = I-abs(v-/p/), where abs(v-/p/) indicates the absolute difference between v and /p/ (Rescher, 1969, 81-82) .8 Intuitively, such a formula states that the proposition that p has the value v is untrue to the extent that the value of p differs from v. The standard Tarskian T schema can be seen as a special instance of this formula in which v and Ip/ are restricted to values of 0 and 1.
At this point we offer a simple illustration of the kinds offormal lessons regarding paradox that such an infinite-valued logic may have to teach, regardless of whether such a logic is taken to be fully defensible philosophically or not.
We start with merely the two classical values and the Simple Liar:
(4) This sentence is false .
Given the standard T schema, by a standard pattern of reasoning the assumption that (4) is true leads to the conclusion that it is false and the assumption that (4) is false leads to the conclusion that it is true. It is therefore quite natural to think of the classical semantic behavior of the Liar as an oscillation between truth-values t and f: t f t f t f t f Consider now the Simple Liar within the context of the infinitevalued logic outlined above.
If (4) is assigned a value of 0, the Vvp schema above forces us to a revised estimate of I-abs(0-0), or 1. Given an estimated value of I, the Vvp schema forces us to conclude that (4) has a value of I-abs(0-1), or 0. Thus if assigned either 0 or 1 the Liar will still give us the familiar oscillation between 0 and 1.
If Here let us also introduce an alternative form of graphic analysis, known as a web diagram, capable of showing patterns of behavior through indefinitely many iterations. In a graph such as that below our initial value a-.25, in this case-is plotted as (a,0). A line is drawn vertically to meet the plotted function f(x) at point (a, f(a)). In order to graphically represent the iteration of the function, we draw a horizontal (to the right or to the left) to a point (f(a), f(a)) on the diagonal y = x and then draw a vertical line from there to our function at (f(a), f(f(a))). This process is repeated.
In this second form of graphic analysis an initial estimated value of .25 for the Liar gives us a simple box, indicating the infinite oscillation between .25 and .75: With an initial estimate of .86, on the other hand, the characteristic Liar-like oscillation appears between .86 and .14:
.86 .14 .86 .14 .86 .14 . values. An alternative way of thinking of the matter, however, is the following: that these sentences have latent ranges of semantic behavior some of which are visible for the first time only when considered within an infinite-valued context. Here we aren't prepared to argue for this second approach as a philosophical thesis, though we must confess that such a view has in fact guided our exploration of patterns of paradox and related metamathematical results.
II.
In introducing some tools of analysis above we illustrated the semantic behavior of the Simple Liar and the Minimalist in the context of an infinite-valued logic. In this section we want to do the same for both traditional relatives of the Liar and a range of new variationsvariations in many cases suggested by the tools of the analysis itself.
THE TRUTH-TELLER AND THE SAMESAYER
Long discussed as a companion to the Liar is the Truth-Teller, which asserts not its own falsity but its own truth: Consider also the Samesayer, a sentence superficially similar to the Truth-Teller but which says that its value is as estimated: 
THE HALF-SAYER
As a variation on the Samesayer consider the Half-Sayer, which says not that its actual value is its estimated value but that it is half its estimated value: Each of these converges to its own fixed point: the 'Quarter-Sayer' has a fixed point of 4/7, the 'Third-Sayer' a fixed point of 3/5. In general, for any k between zero and one, the attractor fixed point for the 'k-Sayer' will be 11(2-k).'1
THE CHAOTIC LIAR
Given an estimated truth v for a sentence, we will speak of its estimated falsehood as (1-v). Consider: Since this is precisely the interval of semantic values within our infinite-valued logic, (9) through (13) will be sentences with genuinely chaotic semantics. In section III we use a strengthened relative of the Chaotic Liar in order to introduce a family of limitative results regarding chaos theory itself.
Here we also note an intriguing relationship between the Chaotic Liar and the Simple Liar.
Let us first introduce the useful notion of the Vvp of a value. A sentence which self-attributes a value s, we've seen, takes a series of values (18) 'is false when appended to its own quotation' is false when appended to its own quotation .
To generalize these ideas to the infinite-valued case, we work with the following natural assumption: that a predicate ir self-applies fully iff the value of ir('r') = 1, and in general applies with a value v iff the value of ir('ir') is v; it applies with the value of .4, say, iff the value of ir('ir') = .4. Now consider (19) 'applies to itself precisely as much as you estimate it does not' applies to itself precisely as much as you estimate it does not .
Let us start with an estimate of .3, say, regarding the degree to which 'applies to itself precisely as much as you estimate it does not' applies to itself. What (19) says is that its value is the opposite of our estimate-that is, (1-.3) or .7. Using the Vvp schema, we are then forced to a revised estimate of I-abs (1-.3)-. 3) or .6. Note that .6 is both a revised estimate for the value of (19) and-by our assumption above-a revised estimate of the self-applicability of the adjectival phrase incorporated in (19).
In general, the formula for revised values of (19) will be given by Here we outline some intriguing relationships in somewhat more detail.
THE CURRY PARADOX
The Curry paradox15 is generated by a conditional C: If C is true, then P , where P is some arbitrarily chosen proposition.
In a standard two-valued logic and given the Tarskian principle that C is true iff what it says is the case, from C we can derive P simpliciter. The paradox, of course, is that P may be any proposition whatsoever; we have seemingly proven any arbitrarily chosen proposition by pure logic alone.
Consider Note that if we substitute the right hand side of the second equation for Yn+ in the first we obtain Xn+1 = 1-abs ([1-(1-abs(1-xn)) ]-x.) Consequently, for xn between 0 and 1, we derive xn+1 = 1-abs ((1-xn)-xn) I which is precisely the formula for the Chaotic Liar.
SOME DUALIST STRANGE ATTRACTORS
Here we offer a further variation on the Dualist, in which both sentences speak of each other in tones akin to that of the Chaotic Liar:
X": X" is true to the extent that Y" is true Y": Y" is true to the extent that X" is false
Alternatively put:
X": X" is as true as Y" Y": Y" is as true as X" is false
What X" says is that its truth-value is that of Y". Using the Vvp schema, then, we can compute its value as 1-abs(/X"/-/Y"/). Given estimates of xn and yn for X" and Y", the value of X" at the next estimate is thus given by:
What Y" says, on the other hand, is that it is true to the extent that X" is false, or that its value is the opposite of that of X". Given the same xn and Yn, in other words,
Yn+1 = 1 -abs((1-xn)-yn)
With initial values of 1/8 and 1/8 for X" and Y"-(.125,.125)-these formulae give us revised values of (1,.25), (.25,.75), (.5,1), (.5,.5), (1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,1), (0,1) ,. . . . Graphically represented, these value pairs (x,y) outline the triangular upper half of the unit square as they move toward a final fixed point of (0,1):
Other pairs of points give us periodic behavior: initial estimates of .4 and .6 for X" and Y", for example, give us as successive value pairs (.8,1), (.8,.2), (.4,1), (.4,.6) The persistence of such an attractor is clearly evident in an overlay diagram for initial points (x,y) in increments of .05 as before: Note that the general shape of the second two escape-time diagrams-despite the fact that the corresponding attractors are quite different-are obviously related both to each other and to the first escape-time diagram, though it is also true that the three differ in an infinite range of details.
The existence of such fractal images within an infinite-valued semantic analysis of paradoxical sentences seems to offer beauty and an intriguing promise of some deep truths. Nonetheless at present we cannot say precisely what they may have to tell us about truth and paradox.
In the next section, however, we do want to offer a clear illustration of at least one area in which the semantical work above offers a route into important philosophical and metamathematical results regarding chaos theory itself. Here we use the pattern of (20) with the general notion of chaotic semantic behavior in order to introduce what might be considered a strengthened form of the Chaotic Liar: (21) Either this sentence has chaotic semantic behavior or its actual truth is its estimated falsehood
Rather than ask whether (21) is true or not, however-the stan-dard question asked of the Strengthened Liar-we will ask whether (21) has chaotic semantic behavior or not. Note that the semantic behavior of a sentence that is simply true will not qualify as chaotic. If thought of on the model of an iterated function at all, it will simply take the value 'true' regardless of previous estimates, and can thus be thought of as giving us merely a constant series of Is.
If (21) does have chaotic semantic behavior, however, it will be simply true in virtue of its first disjunct. By our reasoning above, then, it won 't be semantically chaotic, and we have derived a contradiction.
If (21) does not have chaotic semantic behavior, on the other hand, its truth-value will depend entirely on its second disjunct and will thus parallel the values of the Chaotic Liar:
(9) The actual truth of this sentence is its estimated falsehood
The semantic behavior of that sentence, however, we know to be chaotic. Thus if (21) is non-chaotic, its semantic behavior will be chaotic, and we have again derived a contradiction.25
Just as the G6del results can be seen as employing a Liar-like sentence within formal systems (and G6del himself alludes to the Richard paradox and the Liar in motivating his (1931)), the results that follow can be seen as employing a formal analogue to this antinomy.
SOME COMPLICATIONS
In what follows we will be concerned with formal systems intended to deal with real arithmetic and adequate for number theory. Systems of real arithmetic include, for example, Rogers' system R (Rogers ( As related results it should perhaps be noted that F will be nonrecursive and undecidable. Assuming Church's thesis, then, there can be no effective method for deciding whether an arbitrary expression of a system such as T determines a function chaotic on the interval [0,1].
These formal limitations on chaos theory can also be seenalong with the halting problem and for that matter G6del's and Tarski 6The Vvp schema outlined below, it appears, may also be more appropriate to a genuine truth-value interpretation of infinite-valued logics than a probabilistic one. We are obliged to Jordan Howard Sobel for calling our attention to this point. 25Within the reasoning of this antinomy, it should perhaps be noted, we have assumed that only the two classical values will be possible for 'has chaotic semantic behavior': that (21) either will or will not be chaotic, and thus that its first disjunct will have a value of either 1 or 0. At least for the present, then, we are not attempting to apply an infinite-valued logic to degrees of chaoticity itself. 261t is also because such systems contain only denumerably many expressions, of course, that they will be g6del numberable using only the natural numbers. 
